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reduced chance of a recession. Some
people, however, start to worry when
these numbers look “unnaturally” low,
too low for the risk actually out there.
That’s when low spreads might signal
excessive speculation. 
Certainly, a variety of credit spreads are
low, abnormally or not. One commonly
used risk spread, between the yields on
Moody’s Baa-rated Bond Index and 10-
year Treasury notes, stands at 102 basis
points (1.82 percent). Granted, this is
down from 379 basis points in October
2002 and well below the average (since
1982) of 205 basis points.
A shorter-term credit spread, the spread
between 90-day commercial paper and
three-month T-bills, now (April 2004)
stands at only 21 basis points. This falls
short of the average over the past several
decades, 32 basis points. Short-term
spreads have been lower, of course, even
going negative in the early 1980s, but the
persistently low spreads since early 2001
certainly stand out.
Do these spreads count as excessively
low? Perhaps not; there are reasons to
believe that the underlying credit risks
are also at low levels. For example, the
default rate on the riskiest, speculative-
grade bonds in the U.S. has dropped dra-
matically over the past several years. The
default rate dropped to 2.7 percent in
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Are asset prices climbing too far too
fast? Do they signal the approach of
an unsustainable boom that the
FOMC should step in and stop before
it gathers speed? Bubbles are notori-
ously hard to spot beforehand, and
even if we were better at it, no one is
sure what the best monetary policy
response would be.
Some participants believed that the pro-
longed period of policy accommodation
had generated a significant degree of
liquidity that might be contributing to
signs of potentially excessive risk-taking
in financial markets.
—FOMC Minutes, December 14, 2004
Despite low inflation, there remains a
concern with rapidly rising prices—of
assets, not goods and services.  Though
many people are happy to see their portfo-
lios grow and their houses appreciate, 
others worry that this signals the start of a
boom and bust cycle that presages another
recession. In this Commentary,we exam-
ine those concerns and the evidence
behind them, paying special attention to
what effect, if any, asset booms and busts
should have on monetary policy.
The policy question is clear in principle,
even if the answer is not. Should the
FOMC react to asset prices? The ques-
tion really has two parts. Few people
disagree that the FOMC can use asset
prices as predictors of inflation, and to
the extent that some asset prices (long-
term Treasury bonds, Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities, CPI futures) help
forecast inflation, it makes sense for the
FOMC to use them. The second part of
the question elicits more disagreement,
however. Should the FOMC react to
other asset prices that may signal exces-
sive risk taking or the start of an unsus-
tainable boom–bust cycle?
Proponents of using asset prices take to
heart the proverb “a stitch in time saves
nine.” They argue that a small action
early on can prevent the asset boom from
getting out of control, avoiding (or at
least reducing) a costly crash later.
Opponents downplay the ability of 
policymakers to detect a boom and dis-
tinguish excess risk from a strong econ-
omy. They believe that standard mone-
tary policy, focusing on the inflation rate
and economic conditions, will accommo-
date asset price increases stemming from
higher profits and increased productivity.
In those cases where asset prices rise
because of excessive risk taking or
unwarranted speculation, they argue,
asset prices will also show through to
aggregate demand and be offset by 
standard monetary policy.
We will take a more detailed look at the
arguments for and against giving asset
prices a prominent role in monetary pol-
icy, but first it makes sense to look at evi-
dence for and against excessive risk tak-
ing in the current financial environment.
■ Evidence: Building the Case?
There’s not too much controversy about
the fact that the FOMC has provided a
large amount of liquidity over the past
several years; the drop in the target fed-
eral funds rates from 6.5 percent to 
1 percent between 2001 and 2003 is 
generally taken as a good indication 
of the stance of policy. A trickier task,
given the richness and depth of Ameri-
can financial markets, is picking out
asset prices that (allegedly) signal 
excessive risk. We can delegate that task
to the FOMC, though; its December 14
minutes record the asset prices that 
concern several committee members.
They note: 
“…narrow credit spreads, a pickup in ini-
tial public offerings, an upturn in mergers
and acquisition activity, and anecdotal
reports that speculative demands were
becoming apparent in the markets for 
single-family homes and condominiums.”
At first, it seems strange to worry about
narrow credit spreads. They are usually a
good thing—a small difference between
the yield on risky corporate bonds and
safe Treasury bonds should signal a low
probability of default, less risk, less
uncertainty about corporate profits, and a
generally strong economy with aor San Francisco. But the fear is that
house prices are rising at an unjustifiable
rate. If it was just the economic recovery
increasing demand, rents in those areas
would be increasing as well. Instead, in
the U.S. the ratio of house prices to rents
has increased by nearly 30 percent in the
past five years, rising particularly fast
since the end of the 2001 recession (see
figure 1). This price-to-rent ratio is a bit
like a P/E or price-to-earnings ratio for
stocks and can serve to signal when the
price is too high and the asset is overval-
ued. After all, if prices rise because
demand is high, rents should also rise,
which is less likely if people buy houses
for the price appreciation and not the
space. Some of the price increase can be
attributed to low interest rates, but that
only raises fears that prices will fall as
interest rates rise. 
There is good reason to suspect that this
increase in the price-to-rent ratio is
exaggerated, however. The home-price
index usually used is put out by the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight (OFHEO) and measures
repeat sales of homes. This has an
advantage: By tracking repeat sales, it
avoids problems of mixing the prices of
new homes (which tend to be higher)
with those of older homes. This means,
however, that it is far from a “constant
quality” home-price index because it
ignores renovations, add-ons, and other
improvements to the property. The rental
index, on the other hand, is a “constant
quality” index, and so part of the
increase arises because the housing-
price index rises as homes improve
while the rent component stays constant;
this imparts an upward bias to the ratio. 
Is this bias important? One way to get a
handle on the question is to look at
another home price index, this one pro-
duced by the Census Bureau. The Cen-
sus people produce a constant-quality
index of new home prices; although its
exact usefulness is subject to some
debate, it delivers a very different price-
to-rent ratio (see figure 2).
Using the Census number, the price-to-
rent ratio is lower than it was in 1983.
Instead of the 19 percent increase since
(March) 2001 using OFHEO data, it
shows only a 7 percent increase. This
apples-to-apples comparison suggests
that much of the increase in home prices
comes from higher quality, not specula-
tive excess.
FIGURE 1 OFHEO HOUSE-PRICE-TO-RENT INDEX














December 2004, down from 5.4 per-
cent in January 2004 and well below
the recent peak of 11.6 percent in Janu-
ary 2002. Defaults are only one part of
the loss equation. The other is recover-
ies, or how much creditors get back in
case of default—what they get when
the assets of the firm are sold off.
Recoveries have been increasing lately;
they came in at 42 percent for 2003, up
from 34 percent in 2001, further indi-
cating that the risks associated with the
reduced spread are lower now.
The pick-up in IPOs (initial public
offerings) also would usually be
greeted as good news. An increase in
new, innovative firms that have
become successful enough to issue
public equity surely is a sign of a
healthy, growing economy. An exces-
sive number of IPOs, though, may sig-
nal overvalued stocks and investors
who have surrendered their natural
skepticism. The IPO market of 2004
was hardly frothy, however. True, IPOs
nearly tripled from their 2003 level,
surging to 188 from a mere 67, but that
was well off 2000’s pace of 397 and
far from 1986’s record pace of nearly 
a thousand (953). Once again, the 
evidence does not seem to point to
excessive risk taking.
The upturn in mergers and acquisition
(M&A) activity has a similar paradoxi-
cal aspect. Normally a growing economy
should see more M&As, and as firms
restructure, finding the most efficient
scale and scope for their industry, merg-
ers unlock firm value for shareholders.
But some see the activity as firms
exploiting their overpriced stocks to
acquire assets while they can. It is the
case that merger activity is high,
although 2004 saw few really big deals,
so the dollar value of mergers and 
acquisition was not particularly large:
The $464 billion for 2004 exceeded the 
$319 for 2003 but fell well below the
trillion-dollar years of the late 1990s.
Furthermore, the percentage of M&As
financed with stock has fallen and 
that financed by cash has risen, perhaps
indicating that firms aren’t cashing in on 
overvalued stock—though one might
question why they have so much cash 
on hand!
The last asset mentioned in the minutes,
and the one most often mentioned in
connection with unsustainable booms
or bubbles, is housing prices. It is not
simply that housing prices are rising;
with real incomes up, it’s not surprising
that higher demand leads to increased
prices, particularly in areas without a lot
of room to expand, such as Manhattan
NOTES: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Index is not adjusted for changes
to physical characteristics of homes. The shaded bars represent recessions.
SOURCE: The Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.■ What’s the Policy?
So a closer look at the numbers makes
it seem less likely that we’re at the start
of an asset price boom–bust cycle. Still,
outcomes are rarely certain in forecast-
ing, so no discussion would be com-
plete without considering the appropri-
ate monetary policy for booms and
busts. As mentioned in the introduction,
the discussion revolves around
whether—and how much—monetary
policy should react to asset prices. Pro-
ponents of reacting hope to tame the
boom and avoid the bust. Opponents
tend to downplay the benefits and
emphasize the costs. 
The argument takes place on several 
levels. At the basic level is the question
of whether we can recognize an asset
boom when it starts and distinguish
booms that policy should respond to
from those that it should not. Most ana-
lysts agree that restraining a speculative
bubble is a good idea, but it’s not easy to
differentiate a bubble from strong funda-
mentals. Three hundred and fifty years
after the famous tulipmania episode in
Holland, economists still debate whether
that event was a bubble. (Admittedly,
this may tell you more about economists
than tulips.) At a somewhat higher level
is the question of whether it’s possible to
pick up the pieces after the crash. The
major concern is that the asset price
crash could bring the rest of the econ-
omy down with it. The canonical exam-
ples are the stock boom of the 1920s,
leading to the Wall Street Crash  and
Great Depression, and the Japan bubble
of the 1980s. 
In both these cases, however, monetary
policy did little to help the situation. In
discussing the Depression, Milton Fried-
man and Anna J. Schwartz, in their mag-
isterial A Monetary History of the United
States,1867–1960 ask, “Why Was Mon-
etary Policy So Inept?” On Japan, Roger
Ferguson, vice-chairman of the Federal
Reserve’s Board of Governors remarks
that “Despite steps toward an expansion-
ary policy, the monetary easing of the
early 1990s was insufficient to mitigate
the underlying weakness…” Indeed, 
Ferguson (among others) argues that the
United States faced a much less severe
recession after the 2001 stock market
crash, in part because of the quick reac-
tion of monetary policy. Coupled with a
strong banking and financial sector
(which were missing both in the 1930s
United States and in Japan), the asset
price bust had less-than-catastrophic
effects, even assuming it was a cause of
the recession.
The two sides also disagree about the
costs of trying to restrain asset price
booms. It’s a bit like buying insurance—
sure, it would be nice, but after you cal-
culate the premium and the deductible,
is it still worth it? Here the discussion is
a bit more subjective, as participants
weigh the costs of slowing the current
economy against the benefits of soften-
ing a future crash. Any decision must
not only balance the chances of cor-
rectly distinguishing a speculative boom
from strong fundamentals, but also
gauge the policy’s effect on output and
employment. 
Making monetary policy, it seems,
doesn’t leave much time to rest on
one’s laurels: Get goods inflation
under control and there are calls to halt
asset price inflation. How to do so
looks like a trickier problem, with
scant evidence of speculative bubbles
and controversy about what to do even
if you found one. It is safe to say that
no consensus has emerged, though
more economists probably favor the
“benign neglect” approach. 
■ Recommended Reading
On the housing bubble or lack thereof: 
“Are Home Prices the Next ‘Bubble’?”
Jonathan McCarthy and Richard W.
Peach, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Economic Policy Review, 
December 2004, pp. 1–17.
On whether monetary policy should
respond to asset prices: 
“Should Central Banks Respond to
Movements in Asset Prices?” 2001. 
Ben S. Bernanke and Mark Gertler,
American Economic Review, Papers
and Proceedings, pp. 253–57.
“Is ‘Benign Neglect’the Right
Response to Asset Price Booms?: 
Interview with Bordo and Jeanne,” 
International Monetary Fund Survey,
2003 (March 31), pp. 86–88.
The quotations on monetary policy 
are from
A Monetary History of the United
States, 1867–1960. Milton Friedman
and Anna J. Schwartz, NBER, Prince-
ton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1963, p. 407. 
“Recessions and Recoveries Associated
with Asset-Price Movements: What Do
We Know?”  Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.,
speech at the Stanford Institute for Eco-
nomic Policy Research, Stanford, Calif.,
January 12, 2005.
FIGURE 2 CENSUS BUREAU CONSTANT-QUALITY INDEX OF NEW
HOME PRICES TO RENTS














NOTES: The constant-quality index accounts for the physical and locational characteristics of homes.
The shaded bars represent recessions.
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